विश्व बैंक और अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय मुद्रा कोष द्वारा दिये गये सुझाव

57. **प्रो॰ विजय कुमार मल्होत्रा:** क्या वित्त मंत्री यह बताने की कृपा करेंगे कि:

(क) विश्व बैंक और अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय मुद्रा कोष ने भारत की अर्थव्यवस्था में सुधार लाने हेतु क्या सुझाव दिये हैं;

(ख) अपने सुझावों को मनवाने के लिए इन अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय संस्थाओं द्वारा क्या दबाव डाले गये हैं; और

(ग) भारत सरकार ने इन सुझावों के संबंध में क्या निर्णय लिये हैं?

वित्त मंत्रालय में राज्य मंत्री और संसदीय कार्य मंत्रालय में राज्य मंत्री (डा॰ अबरार अहमद): (क) आर्थिक सुधारों का चालू कार्यक्रम वृहत्-आर्थिक स्थिरीकरण और संरचनात्मक समायोजन संबंधी सरकार की अपनी कार्यनीति पर आधारित है जिसकी शुरुआत 1991 में की गई थी। इस कार्यक्रम को विश्व बैंक और अंतर्राष्ट्रीय मुद्रा कोष दोनों से व्यापक समर्थन मिला है।

(ख) इन अंतर्राष्ट्रीय संस्थाओं द्वारा कोई दबाव नहीं डाला गया है।

(ग) प्रश्न नहीं उठता।

Recovery Performance of Cooperative Institutions in Gujarat

58. SHRI AHMED MOHMEDBHAI PATEL: Will the Minister of FINANCE be pleased to refer to the answer to U.Q 1483 given in Rajya Sabha on 14.12.93 and state:

(a) whether it is a fact that the Agricultural and Rural Debt Relief (ARDR) Scheme has adversely affected recoveries of the Co-operative Credit structure and vitiated the general recovery climate; and

(b) if so, what action Government have taken for improvement of recovery performance of the co-operative institutions in the State?

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS (DR. ABRAR AHMED): (a) and (b) Due to the implementation of the Agricultural and Rural Debt Relief (ARDR) Scheme, 1990, the iceoveries of cooperative credit institutions had been affected. This had resulted in poor recycling of funds by the cooperatives in most of the States. Pursuant to the initiatives taken by National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), the State Government of Gujarat took the following steps to improve the recovery performance:—

(i) The order for ban on recovery was withdrawn;

(ii) the borrowers were impressed through audio visuals/press releases on the essentiality of repayments of loans; and

(iii) Assurance was given by the State Government for extension of whole-hearted cooperation to banks in their recovery drive,

Further, NABARD has advised the cooperative banks in the State to prepare action plans for recovery and to monitor them effectively to achieve higher recovery rates so as to improve their viability.

Rise in Security Prices

59. SHRI SURESH PACHOURI: Will the Minister of FINANCE be pleased to state:

(a) whether SEBI's decision to ban forward trading is likely to be one of the tough measures to be introduced if the market continues to behave in the manner it had been behaving in December, 1993 and January, 1994;

(b) if so, whether the Ministry of Finance has informed about the strategy which was occasioned by the rapid rise in security prices in December, 1993 and January, 1994;

(c) if so, whether any final decision in regard to further steps to check the market aberrations have been worked out; and

(d) if so, the details thereof?

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS (DR. ABRAR AHMED): (a) and (b) Keeping in view the rise in the prices of shares, the stock exchanges at Bombay, Ahmedabad, New Delhi and Calcutta were directed by SEBI on 13.12.1993 to ensure that no carry-forward of transactions in securities would be allowed except for the purpose of liquidating the then existing carry-forward business positions of members and that, henceforth, all transactions in securities would be settled at the end of each settlement by delivery and payment. The regulatory measures to be taken by SEBI in future in relation to stock market would depend upon the requirements of the market from time to time. SEBI has been keeping the Government informed on the situation in the stock market.

(c) and (d) Monitoring and regulation of the stock market by SEBI are a continuous process and SEBI will take necessary action as warranted.

Backlog of SC/ST Vacancies in UCO Bank

60. SHRIMATI KAILASHPATI; Will the MINISTER OF FINANCE be pleased to state:

(a) Whether UCO Bank Management has held a test for promotion to the Officers' Cadre in Junior Management Grade S-l on 2nd August, 1993 from amongst its clerical cadre;

(b) whether there is backlog of reserved vacancies for SCs/STs, if so, the details, thereof;

(c) whether 50 per cent of the total number of notified vacancies can be made available to the SC/ST employees for clearance of their unfilled backlog vacancies as per Government directives;

(d) whether UCO Bank Management propose to take necessary steps to fill up the above backlog of vacancies in officers' Cadre in the ensuing promotion process, if not, the reasons thereof; and

(e) whether UCO Bank. Management has taken any steps to fulfil the backlog vacancies in Officers" Cadre in Junior Management Grade S-l and if not, the reasons therefor'?.

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS (DR. ABRAR AHMED): (a) UCO Bank has reported that a promotion test was held on 22.8.93 for promotion to the Officers cadre in Junior Management Grade Scalc-I from amongst its clerical cadre.

(b) According to the bank there is a backlog of 154 for SCs/STs (SC 9,3 & ST 61) in promotions from clerical to the Officers cadre JMGS-I.

(c) Yes, Sir.

(d) and (e) In the above promotion process of the bank, a total of 389 vacancies in the Officers cadre (JMGS1) are. to be filled in. Of these 195 vacancies have been reserved for SC/ ST candidates subject to availability of required number of suitable SC/ST candidates within the extended zone of consideration (maximum 5 times of the total vacancies).

Closing Down of Non-Viable Branches of GIC

61. SHRI VIREN J. SHAH:
SHRI PRAMOD MAHAJAN:

Will the MINISTER OF FINANCE be pleased to state:

(a) whether it is a fact that general Insurance Company has decided to close down all the non-viable branches of its four subsidiaries which arc running ink) losses;

(b) if so, what are the details of each such unviable branch in each of the subsidiary;